Venezuela: Analysis of the reliability of the audit proposed by Electoral Council
By K.R.
29.11.06 | Attached please find the executive summary of the study (realized by the USB study group: Salas, Delfino, Febres Cordero, Malpica, Pericci) that describes the selective migration of electors from traditionally majority "officialist" voting centers (mother centers) to newly created satellite (son centers). By realizing a non random migration of practically all the members of selected voting tables to attached satellite centers, both the mother and satelite centers will have created tables where the voter preference will be for the incumbent candidate. Additionally, the number of migrated tables in each center coincides with the number of tables to be audited in the center. It has also been determined that the majority of migrated centers have Presidents who are "patriots". A large number of the migrated centers are located in border areas, of difficult control for the Rosales camp. This "gerrymandering of sorts" constitutes the preparatory steps leading to the potential perpetuation of electoral fraud.
By controlling the voter center, the "Patriot" table presidents could select the tables to be audited in a selective manner, and thus ensure that the tables audited are those that will show an electoral preference for the incumbent.
The final step to alter voter preference results can occur if the non audited table results are modified electronically to match the results demonstrated in the audited tables. The "captahuellas" laptop provides the real time information platform of which centers are required to selectively alter non audited table results.
To be of use in this tampered election (the REP has been selectively altered, presumably for the purpose here described), the exit polls need to address two objectives. The first being the identification of the real electoral result, and the second, identifying electoral fraud as it happens.
We feel that from 9am on, the exit polls/observation, to determine voter preference and the table the voter voted at (last two digits of the ID #) done on selectively migrated centers, will show a non random distribution of voter preference, with the selectively migrated tables now identified, showing a large preference for the incumbent, and the other tables showing a very different result. Also, a visual evaluation of the voting queues at populated urban centers, will show significant lines of voters for the incumbent, whereas random voters in other queues. At border and less populated areas, some lines will show heavy voters for the incumbent, whereas the other queues may show very few voters (given the use of virtual voters). The same will happen with the polling of electoral results. Non selectively migrated centers will not show any abnormal difference of voter preference among the different tables of a center. These unusual "coincidences" need to be called immediately.
The exit poll/observation needs to call the unusual voter preference behaviour as it becomes apparent, in the centers where the identified voter migration has taken place. This list of centers has been provided to the Rosales Camp, and to the OAS and EU observation teams.
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